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APPEALING TO EMPATHY: COUNSEL’S 
OBLIGATION TO PRESENT MITIGATING EVIDENCE 
FOR JUVENILES IN ADULT COURT 
Beth Caldwell* 
The case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.  Retribution 
is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose 
culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of 
youth and immaturity.   
-Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Media representations of youth as “superpredators” and “monsters” fuel public 
fear of juvenile offenders.1  These depictions infiltrate public consciousness and 
promote widespread misconceptions about the prevalence of youth crime and the 
nature of juvenile delinquents.2  In public discourse, youth who break the law are 
characterized as hardened criminals who will continue to prey upon innocent 
victims unless they are incarcerated.  However, a closer examination of the life 
stories of young people who commit serious crimes reveals histories characterized 
by trauma, victimization, and abuse – almost without exception.3  A central part of 
a lawyer’s job is to uncover these stories and to tell them in a compelling way.  The 
effective presentation of mitigating information can pierce the initial tendency of a 
judge or prosecutor to view a defendant as unequivocally deserving of retribution.  
Shifting the perceptions of those with the power to make key decisions can 
dramatically impact the outcome of a case.  It may result in the chance to remain in 
juvenile court rather than be transferred to adult court, better plea bargain offers, or 
sentences focused more on rehabilitation than on long prison sentences.4 
                                                                                                                 
        * J.D., UCLA; Master’s in Social Welfare, UCLA.  Faculty Fellow, Thomas Jefferson School of 
Law.  The case studies referenced in this Article are derived from my experiences as a public defender 
in Los Angeles County and as the Director of Youth Development at Venice Community Housing 
Corporation. 
 1. For a more thorough discussion of the impact of media representations of youth on juvenile 
justice policy, see Beth Caldwell & Ellen C. Caldwell, “Superpredators” and “Animals”– Images and 
California’s “Get Tough on Crime” Initiatives, 11 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 61 (2011). 
 2. For example, a 1996 poll in California indicated that sixty percent of respondents believed that 
young people were responsible for most violent crime, whereas youth were actually only responsible for 
thirteen percent of violent crime at the time of the survey.  LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, 
BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, OFF BALANCE:  YOUTH, RACE & CRIME IN THE NEWS 4 (2001), 
available at www.cclp.org/documents/BBY/offbalance.pdf. 
 3. For example, psychiatrist Marty Beyer reports that 48 out of 50 youth offenders he evaluated for 
court had experienced severe trauma.  Marty Beyer, Fifty Delinquents in Juvenile and Adult Court, 76 
LN. 2 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 206, 207 (2006). 
 4. See generally REHABILITATING LAWYERS: PRINCIPLES OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE FOR 
CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE (David B. Wexler ed., 2008) (discussing the importance of gathering 
information about mitigation and rehabilitative options in criminal defense practice). 
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The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Roper v. Simmons5 and Graham v. 
Florida6 demonstrate that mitigating information about a young person accused of 
a crime is important to courts.  In both Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court 
considered the tragic life histories of young defendants in conjunction with 
adolescent development research.  In Roper, the Court held that sentencing juvenile 
offenders to death violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.7  Similarly, the Graham decision found the punishment of life 
without the possibility of parole unconstitutional for juveniles convicted of non-
homicide offenses.8  Mitigating information helped to frame the Court’s 
understanding of the complicated developmental issues impacting juvenile 
offenders in both of these landmark cases.   
The Graham decision has been cited as groundbreaking in many regards9 and 
has spawned academic debate regarding its implications.10  The holding of Graham 
specifically prohibits sentencing juveniles not convicted of homicide offenses to 
life without the possibility of parole.11  Courts are wrestling with how to apply 
Graham’s holding to cases that are similar to – yet slightly different from – the 
scenario the Court specifically addressed.  Most of these cases relate rather 
specifically to extending Graham’s narrow holding to apply to other (similar) 
categories of juvenile offenders.  For example, the United States Supreme Court 
heard oral argument in March 2012 regarding whether sentencing juvenile 
homicide offenders to life without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth 
Amendment.12  In addition, the California Supreme Court is considering whether 
Graham prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders to lengthy prison sentences that 
exceed their life expectancies because such sentences amount to de facto life 
without parole.13  Although much of the litigation regarding Graham’s applicability 
                                                                                                                 
 5. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that juveniles cannot be sentenced to death). 
 6. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding that juveniles convicted of non-homicide 
crimes cannot be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole). 
 7. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 8. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2037. 
 9. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Juvenile Justice Reform 2.0, 20 BROOK. J. L. & POL’Y 15, 20 (2012) 
(“Each of these decisions [Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011; and J.D.B v. North Carolina, 
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011)] has been hailed as ‘landmark,’ and together they have raised expectations 
among scholars, advocates, and practitioners that a new era of reform may be emerging for youth 
offenders.”); Marsha Levick, Kids Really Are Different: Looking Past Graham v. Florida, 87 Crim. L. 
Rep. 664 (BNA) (July 14, 2010) (arguing that Roper and Graham “provide the framework for a 
developmentally driven juvenile Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that has potentially broad 
implications for the laws, policies, and practices that govern the treatment of offenders under the age of 
18, particularly sentencing practices.”); Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile 
Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99, 100 (2010) (“The new categorical rule established by Graham has 
the potential to profoundly impact the field of juvenile justice and youth policies as a whole.”) 
 10. See Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility:  Can Malice Supply the Want of Years?, 
86 TUL. L. REV. 309 (2011). 
 11. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
 12. Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (to 
be argued in tandem with Jackson v. Norris, 651 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. 132 S. 
Ct. 548 (2011)).  
 13. See People v. Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), review granted and opinion 
superseded by 255 P.3d 951 (Cal. 2011); People v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2011) review granted and opinion superseded by 250 P.3d 179 (Cal. 2011). 
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focuses on whether the holding applies to relatively similar sentences or offenders, 
the Supreme Court seems to have indicated a willingness to apply Graham’s 
reasoning more broadly.  In 2011, the Court held in J.D.B. v. North Carolina that 
given the widely recognized differences between juveniles and adults, courts must 
consider a young person’s age when determining whether an individual was in 
custody for purposes of determining whether Miranda warnings were required.14   
Some scholars have suggested that Graham has broad ramifications for the 
treatment of juvenile offenders.15  Tamar Birckhead suggests that Roper, Graham, 
and J.D.B. may provide the basis for legal reforms emphasizing the need to treat 
juveniles and adults differently in the criminal context and minimizing the use of 
long-term incarceration of youth.16  She also notes that these cases “could support 
litigation that results in rigorous client-centered representation for juveniles,” and 
could require “prosecutors, judges, and probation officers [to] take into account the 
youth’s brain development [and] mental and emotional state” at disposition or 
sentencing hearings.17  Neelum Arya argues that several of the Court’s collateral 
holdings in Graham prohibit prosecuting juveniles in adult criminal courts.18  
Indeed, the Court’s reasoning in the Graham decision emphasizes the unique 
position of juvenile offenders in terms of their development, diminished levels of 
culpability, and capacity for change.19  One California appellate court decision – 
People v. Mendez – took the Court’s reasoning to heart, resting its decision on the 
principles and findings set forth in Graham.20  The Mendez court incorporated the 
spirit of the Graham decision more broadly than other courts, relying on its 
reasoning to find that mitigating evidence about a juvenile offender facing a 
lengthy adult prison sentence must be presented at a sentencing hearing.21  This 
Article builds on the innovate approach of the Mendez decision, exploring the 
importance of mitigating information in juvenile defense practice and discussing 
post-conviction strategies for challenging sentences imposed without adequate 
consideration of mitigating evidence. 
Part Two discusses the tremendous impact mitigating information can have on 
the outcome of a case.  It begins with a review of the mitigating information 
presented about the defendants in both Roper and Graham and incorporates 
examples of mitigating evidence included in recent California decisions 
                                                                                                                 
 14. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399.  
 15. See Arya, supra note 9, at 102 (“This Article suggests that lawyers consider using Graham to 
ensure that every child under the age of eighteen, regardless of whether the child has been given a 
[juvenile life without parole] sentence, is entitled to a chance to ‘atone for his crimes and learn from his 
mistakes’ so that he may ‘demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not 
representative of his true character.’ Graham is not merely an extension or incremental continuation of 
Roper, but provides significant fodder for a reexamination of our juvenile justice policies more broadly, 
including the possibility of removing retribution as a valid goal of the criminal justice system as applied 
to youth, and firmly establishing a constitutional right to rehabilitation.”) (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 
2033).) 
 16. Birckhead, supra note 9, at 49-50. 
 17. Id. at 50. 
 18. Arya, supra note 9, at 152. 
 19. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-29. 
 20. People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
 21. Id. at 882-84. 
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interpreting Graham.  Part Three sets forth the framework for potential post-
conviction challenges based on the argument that failure to present mitigating 
evidence about a juvenile client in adult court constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Part Four explores alternative mechanisms for providing incarcerated 
juvenile offenders the opportunity to present evidence of rehabilitation in an effort 
to facilitate the type of “meaningful opportunity for release” that the Graham 
decision guarantees.  Part Five discusses specific skills and techniques attorneys 
should develop in order to gather and present mitigating information about juvenile 
clients.  Drawing from therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship, as well as this 
author’s background in the field of Social Welfare, this discussion presents multi-
disciplinary techniques that enhance the legal representation of youth. 
II.  THE NECESSITY OF MITIGATING EVIDENCE 
A.  The Role of Mitigation in Roper and Graham 
Presenting Christopher Simmons and Terrence Graham as children who had 
experienced victimization likely shaped the way in which the Supreme Court 
viewed their cases.  It is impossible to surmise the extent to which framing their 
stories in the context of their traumatic childhoods influenced the Court’s decisions 
in these landmark decisions.  We do know, however, that storytelling can play a 
powerful role in shaping legal outcomes.22  We also know that these narratives 
were underdeveloped at the trial court level in both Roper and Graham.  In both 
cases, the trial courts imposed sentences that the Supreme Court then reversed; the 
different outcomes may very well have been shaped by the mitigating information 
presented at the Supreme Court level.   
The trial court in Terrence Graham’s case seemed oblivious to the 
dysfunctional aspects of his home life.  The sentencing judge told the young man, 
“as far as I can tell, you have quite a family structure.  You had a lot of people who 
wanted to try and help you get your life turned around. . . .”23  In contrast, 
Graham’s appellate attorneys emphasized mitigating information about their client, 
framing his criminal conduct within the context of his traumatic childhood.24  In the 
opening brief to the Supreme Court, the discussion of the case history commences 
with a two-paragraph summary of Terrence’s childhood, beginning with the fact 
that he was addicted to cocaine when he was born.25  The brief explains how his 
parents’ crack addictions impacted his mental health.26  Terrence was clinically 
depressed and was diagnosed with ADHD, yet he did not receive the recommended 
treatment because his mother advised him not to take the prescribed medication.27  
His father and siblings spent time in prison and juvenile detention facilities while 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Philip N. Meyer, Vignettes from a Narrative Primer, 12 LEG. WRITING 229 (2006) 
(discussing the importance of narrative and storytelling in legal advocacy with a particular emphasis on 
criminal appeals). 
 23. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2019. 
 24. Id. at 2018. 
 25. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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he was growing up.28  Painting a portrait of a traumatized child with little parental 
support challenges the trial court’s perception of Terrence as a young man who had 
been given plenty of opportunities to succeed yet, for some inexplicable reason, 
chose to commit his life to engaging in crime.29  The effective presentation of 
compelling mitigation evidence at the Supreme Court level may well have 
contributed to the outcome of the case.  Indeed, the mitigating information about 
Graham’s life history was important to the Supreme Court, as evidenced by the 
Court’s reference to his traumatic childhood in the first part of the decision.30  The 
second paragraph of the opinion provides the petitioner’s name and birth date.31  It 
then immediately provides the following information: “Graham’s parents were 
addicted to crack cocaine, and their drug use persisted in his early years.  Graham 
was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in elementary school.  
He began drinking alcohol and using tobacco at age nine and smoked marijuana at 
age thirteen.”32  The opinion’s reference to Terrence Graham’s childhood 
difficulties, particularly at the beginning of the opinion, signals that this 
information made an impact on the Court. 
In Roper, Christopher Simmons—who was seventeen years old at the time of 
his offense - was sentenced to death after his attorney failed to present extensive 
mitigating information at the death penalty sentencing phase.33  After he was 
sentenced, a new attorney moved to set aside Simmons’s conviction and sentence 
on the basis that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to present 
sufficient evidence of mitigation.34  Mitigating information, including testimony by 
clinical psychologists and neighbors, painted the picture of a child who was raised 
in a “difficult home environment,” who struggled in school, and who was out of 
school for long periods of time.35  The trial court denied the motion to set aside the 
conviction and sentence, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed,36 and a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel was 
denied.37  Ultimately, the Supreme Court addressed a different issue based upon the 
2002 Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, which held that executing 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 12. 
 29. For example, the trial court stated:  
Mr. Graham, as I look back on your case, yours is really candidly a sad situation.  You 
had, as far as I can tell, you have quite a family structure.  You had a lot of people who 
wanted to try and help you get your life turned around including the court system, and 
you had a judge who took the step to try and give you direction through his probation 
order to give you a chance to get back onto track.  And at the time you seemed through 
your letters that that is exactly what you wanted to do.  And I don’t know why it is that 
you threw your life away.  I don’t know why. . . .  The only thing that I can rationalize is 
that you decided that this is how you were going to lead your life and that there is nothing 
that we can do for you.  
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2019-20. 
 30. Id. at 2018. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 558-59 (2005). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 559. 
 36. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1997). 
 37. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559. 
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mentally retarded defendants constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment.38  Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. 
Simmons did not address the lack of mitigating evidence presented at the trial court 
level, the Court did consider evidence of mitigation about Christopher Simmons’s 
childhood.  Just as in Graham, the Court signaled that this information was 
important by devoting attention to it in the opinion.39  It described expert testimony 
about his “difficult home environment,” “poor school performance,” long absences 
from home, and substance abuse.40  The Court also noted that “[p]art of the 
submission was that Simmons was ‘very immature,’ ‘very impulsive,’ and ‘very 
susceptible to being manipulated or influenced.’”41  These characteristics, which 
the Court concluded are normative features of adolescence, ultimately factored 
heavily into the legal analysis in the decision.42  The Court specifically found 
“[t]hree general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that 
juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst 
offenders.”43  Of particular relevance to this Article’s discussion of mitigation, the 
Graham opinion cites adolescents’ immaturity and susceptibility to peer pressure as 
two major differences that call for the recognition of the diminished culpability of 
juvenile offenders.44  It appears that the mitigating information about Christopher’s 
childhood and characteristics made an impact on the way the Court framed and 
understood the issues presented in the case. 
B.  Mitigation in the Lives of Juveniles in Adult Court 
Social science research demonstrates the existence of high levels of abuse, 
victimization, trauma, and neglect in the lives of most youth offenders.  This is the 
type of information that can be uncovered and presented as mitigation evidence.  
Exploring childhood trauma helps provide the context in which young people 
commit crimes and makes their criminal behavior more understandable.  One 
psychiatrist who conducted developmental evaluations of fifty juvenile offenders – 
some who were processed in juvenile courts and others through adult courts—
reported, “[r]egardless of age, offense, or classification as a juvenile or adult, these 
50 delinquents had a high incidence of trauma and disabilities, as well as immature 
thinking and unformed identities typical of adolescents.”45  Similarly, studies with 
larger sample sizes consistently demonstrate widespread experiences with physical 
and sexual abuse among female delinquents.46  Many young offenders also have 
                                                                                                                 
 38. 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper, 543 U.S. at 559. 
 39. Roper, 543 U.S. at 558-59. 
 40. Id. at 559. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 569-70. 
 43. Id. at 569. 
 44. Id. at 569-71. 
 45. Beyer, supra note 3, at 206.  Notably, forty-eight of the fifty youth had “experienced severe 
trauma, including repeated abuse and/or death of an important person and/or abandonment since early 
childhood.”  Id. at 207.  Many had experienced physical or sexual abuse, and forty-two percent of these 
youth had learning disabilities.  Id. at 208. 
 46. See MEDA CHESNEY-LIND & RANDALL G. SHELDEN, GIRLS, DELINQUENCY, AND JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 34-35 (2d ed.1998). 
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mental health needs that have gone untreated.  A study including 1,829 youth in a 
the Chicago area’s Cook County juvenile detention facility found that 65% of the 
boys and 71% of the girls met the criteria for being diagnosed with a psychiatric 
disorder.47  A Florida study of three hundred young offenders found that 82% had a 
mental health issue and 51% had potential substance abuse problems.48  Most 
young offenders have experienced situations in their lives that call out for 
sentencing mitigation.  Motivated by a desire to uncover this information – and 
equipped with the knowledge and skills to do so effectively – attorneys can 
dramatically impact the outcome of these young offenders’ criminal cases by 
presenting information about childhood trauma, abuse, disabilities, and mental 
health issues in court.  
C.  The Impact of Mitigating Evidence on Judicial Decision-Making 
Presenting mitigating information about a client transforms the way people 
perceive the criminal act he committed.  Highlighting a history of victimization 
humanizes the individual and contextualizes his criminal behavior.  In addition, 
telling an individual’s life story complicates the tendency to demonize and blame 
the individual.  Rather, it exposes the range of factors that create the conditions 
under which young people engage in serious crime, widening the web of people 
and institutions that are responsible for these conditions and, by extension, for the 
crime committed.   
Judges who learn about the tragic details of a young offender’s life are likely 
to be more open to rehabilitative sentencing options.  People tend to support less 
severe punishments when they are presented with a greater level of detail regarding 
the circumstances of a crime.49  Research demonstrates that “‘[w]hen people are 
told about an offender’s history of childhood abuse, for example, their desire for 
severe punishment diminishes.’”50  A recent study revealed that when people were 
asked to choose between trying a juvenile offender in juvenile or adult court, study 
participants were much more likely to select juvenile court if they were informed 
that the young person had been abused.51   
Judges’ decisions are likely impacted in a similar way.  Imagine, for example, 
what a judge’s initial response to hearing about a sixteen-year-old teenager who 
sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-old neighbor might be.  Characterized as a 
sexual deviant who preyed upon his innocent cousin to satisfy his personal desires, 
this young man did not initially engender empathy from the court.  However, when 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Elizabeth Cauffman & Thomas Grisso, Mental Health Issues Among Minority Offenders in the 
Juvenile Justice System, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 390, 398 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-
Leonard eds., 2005). 
 48. Id. at 399. 
 49. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass 
Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 175 (2011). 
 50. Id. at 176 (quoting JULIAN V. ROBERTS & MICHAEL J. HOUGH, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC 
ATTITUDES TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 24 (2005)). 
 51. Narina Nunez, Minday J. Dahl, Connie M. Tang & Brittney L. Jensen, Trial Venue Decisions in 
Juvenile Cases:  Mitigating and Extralegal Factors Matter, 12 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 
21, 37 (2007). 
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the young man’s attorney uncovered Child Protective Services (CPS) records 
detailing that he had been the victim of extreme physical and sexual abuse 
throughout his childhood, the judge’s perspective shifted.  Further details about his 
childhood reinforced the profound victimization this young man experienced 
himself.  Records indicated that he was born with opiates in his system to a mother 
who abused heroin and alcohol throughout her pregnancy.  CPS records revealed 
that he was removed from his parents four times prior to the age of six.  When he 
was three-years-old, he was left outside in the snow while his mother was on a drug 
binge.  At least three adult relatives sexually abused and/or sodomized the child 
when he was three to six years old.  Presented with detailed information about the 
trauma this young man experienced at a very early age, the court was more inclined 
to interpret his actions in the context of this trauma.  The legal issues were thus 
viewed through this lens, and a greater emphasis was placed on crafting a 
rehabilitative sentence.   
The Supreme Court has recognized that this type of mitigating information 
may well impact the outcome of a sentence in the death penalty context.52  In 
Rompilla v. Beard, the Court reasoned that mitigating evidence about the 
defendant’s experiences of childhood abuse, mental impairments, parental neglect, 
and developmental disability “might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal of 
[his] culpability . . . and the likelihood of a different result if the evidence had gone 
in is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome actually reached at 
sentencing.”53  Similarly, in Wiggins v. Smith the Court stated: “Had the jury been 
able to place petitioner’s excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the 
scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a 
different balance” with regards to the sentence imposed.54  The impact of this kind 
of information is not limited to the death penalty context and would likely impact 
decisions of judges and prosecutors considering other sentencing options as well.    
Over the past year, a string of California cases have considered the 
applicability of the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham – which specifically 
prohibited sentencing juveniles to life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) 
for non-homicide crimes – to cases where juveniles are sentenced to de facto 
LWOP sentences.  A split of authority has emerged among appellate courts with 
regards to whether Graham’s holding restricts sentencing juveniles to prison 
sentences that exceed the life expectancy of the offender, and the California 
Supreme Court is currently considering the issue.55  Although there are various 
possible explanations for the split of authority, the presence of mitigating 
information about the offender – or lack thereof – may very well have swayed the 
outcomes of these cases.  More importantly, courts’ consistent reference to 
mitigating information about the lives of these young offenders indicates that such 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003). 
 53. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393 (citation omitted). 
 54. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537. 
 55. See People v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), review granted and 
opinion superseded by 250 P.3d 179 (Cal. 2011)..  Other state court decisions on this issue, including 
Georgia, Arizona, and Florida, have limited Graham’s application to sentences specifically labeled as 
“life without parole” and have declined to extend the holding to limit the imposition of term-of-years 
sentences.  See, e.g., Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
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information matters. 
The California cases holding that non-homicide juvenile offenders may not be 
sentenced to prison terms exceeding their life expectancies incorporate mitigating 
information about the offenders into their opinions, demonstrating that courts have 
found this evidence to be important to their understanding of these cases.  In 
People v. J.I.A., an appellate court considered whether sentencing a juvenile to fifty 
years to life plus two consecutive life terms for non-homicide convictions 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.56  The court dedicated a substantial 
portion of its analysis to a discussion of the defendant’s “extremely abusive 
childhood,” which included sexual abuse at the age of five or six.57  Referencing 
Graham’s consideration of the defendant’s background, including parental neglect, 
his mental health diagnoses, and his history of substance abuse, the court concluded 
that J.A.’s “family life and upbringing are also highly relevant to the analysis.”58  
In addition, the court emphasized the fact that J.A. was “mentally retarded” or, at 
the very least, of “substandard intelligence.”59  Based upon this information, the 
court concluded that the sentence was cruel and unusual punishment because “he is 
not eligible for parole until about the time he is expected to die.”60  The court 
therefore modified the sentence to run concurrently rather than consecutively, 
thereby allowing that he would be eligible for parole when he is fifty-six years old, 
after serving forty-two and a half years in prison.61  
Similarly, an appellate court reversed the sentence of Antonio de Jesus Nuñez, 
concluding that a sentence of one-hundred and seventy-five years to life is a de 
facto sentence of life without parole and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment 
under Graham.62  The opinion emphasized mitigating evidence about Antonio’s 
childhood.  Specifically, the opinion recounts “the post-traumatic stress disorder” 
that was “informed by his trauma history of having been shot, his brother being 
shot and killed, his life being threatened, and seeing people shot and killed in his 
neighborhood.”63  The court went on to explain that Antonio’s brother was shot 
while attempting to help Antonio.64  The opinion noted that Antonio had been 
diagnosed with major depression, was amenable to treatment in juvenile hall, and 
suffered from “‘adverse developmental factors including early alcohol and drug 
use, neglect and abuse, and possible cognitive defects.’”65  Mitigating evidence 
clearly impacted the court, as evidenced by the substantial attention devoted to 
these issues in its opinion. 
In another California appellate case, the court declined to find an Eighth 
Amendment violation when a fifteen year old was sentenced to thirty-five years 
                                                                                                                 
 56. People v. J.I.A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), review granted and opinion 
superseded by 260 P.3d 283 (Cal. 2011). 
 57. Id. at 146, 152 (describing additional details about physical, emotional, and sexual abuse he 
suffered). 
 58. Id. at 152. 
 59. Id.   
 60. Id. at 149. 
 61. Id. at 154. 
 62. In re Nuñez, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 63. Id. at 261. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 252. 
2012] APPEALING TO EMPATHY 401 
and eight months to life, noting that “the paucity of the record in this matter fails to 
support an as applied challenge to defendant’s sentence” because essentially no 
mitigating information was presented.66  Specifically, the court noted that “the 
record contains no information about defendant’s upbringing”67 and concluded, 
“[w]ithout sufficient mitigating evidence about defendant, there is nothing to 
counterbalance the fact that the robberies, and the use of a firearm during each of 
the robberies, present a clear danger to society justifying a lengthy sentence.”68  
Rather than reversing the sentence and requiring the trial court to consider 
mitigating information in determining the appropriate sentence, as in Mendez, the 
court ruled that the evidence presented did not render his sentence cruel and 
unusual under the Eighth Amendment.69  The court suggested instead that he could 
bring a writ of habeas corpus, which would provide a remedy “should he be able to 
garner evidence beyond the record provided on appeal.”70 
People v. Mendez emphasizes the importance of presenting mitigating 
evidence at a sentencing hearing of a juvenile offender in light of Graham’s 
reasoning.71  In that case, the court concluded that a sentence of eighty-four years 
to life for a juvenile not convicted of homicide constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment because it amounts to a “de facto LWOP sentence.”72  The opinion 
devoted substantial attention to the lack of mitigating evidence presented by 
counsel in this case, stating:  
We are particularly troubled here by the fact that the record is silent as to 
Mendez’s personal and family life and upbringing.  This is important 
because the particular characteristics of the offender are relevant to the 
harshness of the penalty and a defendant’s culpability.  The record is silent 
as to the reasons Mendez joined a gang in the first place, any drug use, 
mental health issues, educational level, etc.  It may well be the case that 
there were mitigating factors that would diminish his culpability and 
expose the harshness of his sentence.  But we simply have no such 
knowledge here.  And it does not appear that the trial court had any such 
evidence before imposing consecutive sentences.73 
The opinion references the Supreme Court’s description of Graham’s childhood, 
explaining that the Court considered “that his parents were drug addicts, that he had 
been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in elementary school, 
and that he began drinking at age 9 and smoking marijuana at age 13.”74  Although 
Mendez does not interpret Graham to require counsel to present mitigating 
evidence, it implies that the absence of such information significantly impacts the 
Court’s ability to analyze whether the sentence at issue constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment.  The decision highlights the importance of mitigation on the 
                                                                                                                 
 66. People v. Roldan, 2011 WL 3873858, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2011). 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at *6. 
 69. Id. at *3. 
 70. Id. at *5. 
 71. People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 884-85 (2010). 
 72. Id. at 882. 
 73. Id. at 884-85 (citations omitted). 
 74. Id. at 885 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010)). 
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outcome of cases where juveniles are subject to sentencing in adult courts. 
Presenting mitigating evidence humanizes individual defendants by presenting 
a counter-narrative to the common assumption that young offenders are “super-
predators.”  Mitigation evidence is often referred to as “empathy evidence” by 
defense attorneys who seek to humanize their clients in the eyes of judges and 
juries.75  This humanization is particularly important given that the vast majority of 
youth facing sentencing in adult courts are youth of color,76 a population that is 
systematically dehumanized and demonized in popular discourse.77    
III.  RAISING AN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM BASED ON FAILURE 
TO PRESENT MITIGATING EVIDENCE  
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires counsel to 
provide effective representation.78  In the context of juvenile defendants, I argue 
that mitigating evidence must be presented in order to meet this standard.  Failure 
to present such evidence can give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
on direct appeal or through a writ of habeas corpus.  This Part draws upon a 
strategy employed by Stanford Law School’s Criminal Defense Clinic in order to 
obtain post-conviction relief for people sentenced under California’s Three Strikes 
Law.79  In the same way that the Stanford Clinic brings ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims to challenge Three Strikes sentences on the basis that counsel failed 
to present mitigating evidence,80 post-conviction attorneys could challenge the 
sentences of juveniles sentenced to lengthy adult prison sentences.   
Under Strickland v. Washington, an attorney is deemed ineffective when his 
performance falls below a reasonable standard, as defined by professional norms, 
and when the attorney’s failures resulted in prejudice.81  Although presenting 
mitigating evidence is not universally required of attorneys in non-death penalty 
sentencing hearings,82 the case is stronger for juvenile defendants.  Professional 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Thomas W. Brewer, Race and Jurors’ Receptivity to Mitigation in Capital Cases:  The Effect of 
Jurors’, Defendants’, and Victims’ Race in Combination, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 529, 532 (2004). 
 76. In 2010, over fifty-five percent of juveniles sentenced for felonies in adult court were Hispanic 
and over twenty-nine percent were Black.  KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE 
JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 2010, at 42 tbl.31 (2011).  Only 10.5% of juveniles sentenced for felonies in 
adult court were White.  Id.  A national study concluded that “African American youth were 
overrepresented and White youth were underrepresented in cases waived to adult court” for all types of 
offenses.  EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME:  DIFFERENTIAL 
TREATMENT OF MINORITY YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 12 (2002). 
 77. See Caldwell & Caldwell, supra note 1. 
 78. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
 79. Michael Romano, Striking Back: Using Death Penalty Cases to Fight Disproportionate 
Sentences Imposed Under California’s Three Strikes Law, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 311, 316 (2010). 
 80. Id. at 318. 
 81. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (“First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must show that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”). 
 82. Criminal defense attorneys arguably are required to introduce mitigating information at 
sentencing.  See Tamar M. Meekins, You Can Teach Old Defenders New Tricks: Sentencing Lessons 
from Specialty Courts, in REHABILITATING LAWYERS, supra note 4, at 144, 145 (explaining that a 
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norms governing juvenile delinquency practice emphasize counsel’s duty to obtain 
and present such information in juvenile courts.  In death penalty cases, counsel is 
ineffective when she fails to adequately gather and present mitigating information 
about the defendant at the sentencing phase of the trial.83  The Stanford Clinic 
pursues post-conviction reversals of sentences imposed under California’s Three 
Strikes Law on the ground that failure to present mitigating evidence at sentencing 
hearings in Three Strikes cases similarly constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel.84  Comparing Three Strikes sentencing hearings to death penalty 
sentencing, the Clinic has succeeded in bringing ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims due to trial counsel’s failure to adequately discover and present mitigating 
information at sentencing.85  Similarly, sentencing hearings for juvenile offenders 
facing substantial prison sentences in adult court arguably require counsel to 
uncover and present mitigating information. 
A.  Establishing an Obligation to Present Mitigating Evidence 
1.  Counsel’s Requirement to Present Mitigating Evidence in Capital Cases 
In the death penalty context, courts are constitutionally required to consider 
“the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the 
particular offense.”86  Accordingly, failure to adequately find and present 
mitigating evidence during the penalty phase constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel.87  A series of three major Supreme Court cases, each of which held an 
attorney ineffective for inadequately presenting mitigating evidence during the 
penalty phase of a capital case, have established relatively high standards for 
requiring attorneys to uncover mitigating evidence in death penalty cases.88  
Traditionally, the Court has distinguished death penalty cases from other criminal 
cases, thus limiting counsel’s burden of presenting mitigating evidence at 
sentencing to death penalty cases.89  In Williams v. Taylor, the Court recognized 
                                                                                                                 
criminal defense attorney is “required to marshal the facts, introduce evidence of mitigating 
circumstances, and assist the defendant in presenting his or her sentencing requests.”). 
 83. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003); 
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (“even when a capital defendant’s family members and the 
defendant himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to make 
reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely 
on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial.”). 
 84. Romano, supra note 79, at 318.   
 85. Id. 
 86. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).  “While the prevailing practice of 
individualizing sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a 
constitutional imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity 
underlying the Eighth Amendment . . .  requires consideration of the character and record of the 
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable 
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”  Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) 
(plurality opinion). 
 87. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984). 
 88. Williams, 529 U.S. 362; Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510; Rompilla, 545 U.S. 374. 
 89. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (“This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty 
of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.  Death, in its finality, 
differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.  
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that the defendant had “a constitutionally protected right [ ] to provide the jury with 
the mitigating evidence that his trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to 
offer.”90  In that case, trial counsel failed to uncover “extensive records graphically 
describing Williams’s nightmarish childhood.”91  Specifically, trial counsel failed 
to present evidence  
that Williams’ parents had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of 
Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been severely and repeatedly 
beaten by his father, that he had been committed to the custody of the 
social services bureau for two years during his parents’ incarceration 
(including one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents 
were released from prison, had been returned to his parents’ custody.92   
Further, trial counsel did not present evidence that he was borderline mentally 
retarded, had limited schooling, and demonstrated helpful, non-violent behavior 
while in prison.93  The Supreme Court concluded that “trial counsel did not fulfill 
their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s 
background,”94 and this failure to present this mitigating evidence “raised ‘a 
reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been 
different’ if competent counsel had presented and explained the significance of all 
the available evidence.”95  The Court’s conclusion that the attorney failed to 
adequately investigate rested upon the commentary accompanying the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice regarding counsel’s duty to investigate.96  These 
standards govern defense counsel generally and are not limited to capital cases.  
Similarly, in Wiggins the defendant suffered a tragic childhood characterized 
by repeated episodes of physical and sexual abuse perpetrated by various adults in 
his life.97  Trial counsel failed to uncover or present this information, and Wiggins 
                                                                                                                 
Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in 
the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”).    
 90. Williams, 529 U.S. at 393. 
 91. Id. at 395. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 399 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 
 96. Id. at 396 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE  4-4.1, cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed. 1980)). 
 97. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 516-18 (2003).  A social worker hired by post-conviction 
counsel reported:   
[P]etitioner’s mother, a chronic alcoholic, frequently left Wiggins and his siblings homes 
alone for days, forcing them to beg for food and to eat paint chips and garbage.  Mrs. 
Wiggins’ abusive behavior included beating the children for breaking into the kitchen, 
which she often kept locked.  She had sex with men while her children slept in the same 
bed and, on one occasion, forced petitioner’s hand against a hot stove burner—an 
incident that led to petitioner’s hospitalization.  At the age of six, the State placed 
Wiggins in foster care.  Petitioner’s first and second foster mother abused him physically 
and, as petitioner explained to [the social worker], the father in his second foster home 
repeatedly molested and raped him.  At age 16, petitioner ran away from his foster home 
and began living on the streets.  He returned intermittently to additional foster homes, 
including one in which the foster mother’s sons allegedly gang-raped him on more than 
one occasion.  After leaving the foster care system, Wiggins entered a Job Corps program 
and was allegedly sexually abused by his supervisor.”   
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was sentenced to death.98  The Supreme Court referenced the standard practice of 
preparing social history reports in capital cases in Maryland at the time of the 
sentencing, and concluded that counsel’s preparation fell short of the standard 
practice in Maryland as well as the standards for death penalty cases articulated by 
the American Bar Association.99  While the Williams opinion relied on ABA 
guidelines regarding criminal defense practice more generally,100 Wiggins drew 
upon more specific professional standards governing attorneys in capital cases.101  
The Court concluded that counsel’s failure to obtain this information “did not 
reflect reasonable professional judgment,”102 and there was a “reasonable 
probability” the jury “would have returned with a different sentence” if it had been 
presented with this mitigating evidence.103 
In Rompilla – the most recent of the string of Supreme Court decisions finding 
ineffective assistance of counsel based upon failure to adequately present 
mitigating information in capital cases – the Court relied upon the American Bar 
Association Standard 4-4.1 (governing a criminal defense attorney’s duty to 
investigate) to conclude that Rompilla’s attorney’s investigation fell short of that 
which would be required under professional norms.104  The Court also referenced 
ABA guidelines related specifically to defense counsel’s obligations in capital 
cases.105  As in Williams and Wiggins, the Court concluded that counsel’s 
inadequate investigation – failure to look in the file regarding his prior convictions, 
which the prosecution relied upon to show aggravation – obscured mitigating 
evidence that would likely have led to a different outcome in the case.106 
Specifically, the defense failed to uncover evidence that his “IQ was in the 
mentally retarded range” and that he showed signs of schizophrenia.107  Further, 
counsel failed to uncover details of Rompilla’s traumatic childhood, including 
exposure to alcohol as a fetus, severe beatings by his father, exposure to domestic 
violence in the home, and his being locked “in a small wire mesh dog pen that was 
filthy and excrement filled.”108 
Defendants are not constitutionally entitled to an “individualized determination 
that punishment is ‘appropriate’” outside of the death penalty context.109  
Accordingly, courts are not required to consider mitigating factors prior to 
sentencing except in capital cases.110  Even though there is no constitutional 
requirement that courts consider mitigating evidence, such evidence is frequently 
presented by defense counsel in discretionary sentencing hearings.  Developing 
                                                                                                                 
Id. at 516-17 (citations omitted). 
 98. Id. at 516. 
 99. Id. at 524. 
 100. Williams, 529 U.S. at 396. 
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such information is important because, in addition to impacting sentencing, it may 
help to secure a better plea bargain.  Despite the importance of mitigation and the 
professional standards that recognize attorneys’ responsibility to develop such 
information, courts do not generally deem counsel ineffective for failing to develop 
mitigating evidence in non-capital cases.  In contrast to death penalty cases where – 
as discussed above – attorneys must present mitigating evidence at sentencing, 
counsel is not clearly required to develop such evidence in non-capital cases.  In 
Strickland, the Court distinguished capital sentencing from “ordinary sentencing,” 
indicating that ordinary sentencing hearings may require a different standard for 
counsel because such hearings may be informal and “involve standardless 
discretion in the sentence.”111  The more formal nature of capital sentencing 
hearings renders them more similar to trials and, according to Strickland, requires 
higher standards for counsel.112  However, under Strickland’s standard requiring 
attorneys to provide representation that is reasonable under professional norms, 
counsel is arguably obligated to similarly present mitigating information in non-
capital sentencing hearings.  The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice – which are 
often relied upon to establish professional norms by which to measure the 
reasonableness of counsel’s representation – require all criminal defense counsel to 
investigate mitigating evidence.113  According to the commentary accompanying 
these standards, “[t]he lawyer has a substantial and important role to perform in 
raising mitigating factors both to the prosecutor initially and to the court at 
sentencing. . . .  Information concerning the defendant’s background, education, 
employment record, mental and emotional stability, family relationships, and the 
like, will be relevant, as will mitigating circumstances surrounding the commission 
of the offense itself.”114  However, courts are generally reluctant to find counsel 
ineffective for failing to adequately prepare evidence of mitigation in non-capital 
cases.  For example, the Ninth Circuit refuses to review habeas petitions based 
upon ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing hearings.115 
2.  The Stanford Clinic Model 
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon failure to present 
mitigating information at sentencing hearings generally fail when the defendant is 
not facing the death penalty.116  However, in spite of this deeply entrenched “death 
is different” approach, the Stanford Clinic has successfully argued that an attorney 
is ineffective if she fails to present mitigating evidence in a California Three 
Strikes sentencing hearing.117  By analogizing Three Strikes sentencing hearings to 
the death penalty context, the Stanford Clinic has convinced California courts that 
failure to present mitigating information at sentencing hearings for Three Strikes 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).  
 112. Id. at 686-87. 
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cases constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.118   
California’s Three Strikes Law requires that a defendant be sentenced to 
twenty-five years to life for committing any felony if he has two prior convictions 
for “serious” or “violent” offenses.119  The twenty-five to life sentence is 
mandatory, but there is one exception: judges are permitted to dismiss a prior strike 
conviction “in the interest of justice,” thus allowing them some discretion not to 
impose a third strike sentence.120  The Clinic has convinced California courts that 
sentencing for a third strike offense is similar to a death penalty sentencing because 
courts are required to consider personal information about a defendant in order to 
determine whether to dismiss a prior strike conviction just as courts must consider 
characteristics of an offender in determining whether to sentence him to death.121  
The California Supreme Court has established that courts must consider “the 
particulars of his background, character, and prospects” in determining whether to 
dismiss a prior conviction such that an enhanced sentence would not apply under 
California’s Three Strikes Law.122  The Clinic has successfully argued that in order 
to adequately consider these issues, courts must be presented with mitigating 
information about a client’s background.  For example, it has uncovered and 
presented information about defendants’ histories of mental health issues, abuse 
and neglect suffered as children, exposure to parental drug addictions or 
alcoholism, prior suicide attempts, and evidence of developmental disabilities that 
was not presented at sentencing.123  California courts have found trial counsel 
ineffective for failing to present this evidence and have accordingly reversed 
twelve Three Strikes sentences.124  This is a unique approach given the general 
reluctance of courts to consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relating 
to sentencing hearings outside of the capital context. 
3.  Mitigation Requirement for Juveniles Sentenced in Adult Courts 
Similarly, attorneys should be obligated to present mitigating evidence at 
sentencing hearings for juveniles, particularly those who are sentenced in adult 
courts.  Juveniles who commit crimes are generally prosecuted in juvenile 
delinquency courts, where professional standards emphasize the importance of 
counsel’s presenting mitigating information at disposition hearings—the juvenile 
court equivalent of sentencing hearings.125  Juveniles who are prosecuted in adult 
courts are different from adults in significant ways, and those differences render the 
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presentation of mitigating evidence critically important in their sentencing 
hearings, particularly because these young offenders may be faced with spending 
the rest of their lives in prison.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Graham rests 
heavily upon the Court’s finding that juveniles are fundamentally different from 
adults, and normative characteristics of adolescents render them less culpable than 
adults.126  Graham’s holding does not address claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, nor does it directly address the issue of presenting mitigating evidence 
about juvenile offenders.  However, the Court’s reasoning emphasizes mitigating 
information about juvenile offenders as a class, reinforcing the importance of 
considering evidence of mitigation in juvenile sentencing.  The Court explained, 
“[t]he judicial exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the 
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, 
along with the severity of the punishment in question.”127  Although the decision 
focuses on normative characteristics that apply to adolescents as a category, the 
reasoning illustrates that considering a juvenile’s diminished culpability is material 
to determining the appropriate sentence.  
In Graham, the Court held that a particular sentence – life without the 
possibility of parole – is unconstitutional as applied to non-homicide juvenile 
offenders because of their diminished culpability.128  Similarly, courts should 
consider information that may diminish the culpability of an individual juvenile 
defendant such that a less severe sentence would be appropriate.  The approach the 
Graham court takes in analyzing the behavior of juvenile offenders emphasizes the 
fundamental importance of considering the “lessened culpability” of juveniles 
based upon neurological and psychological characteristics of adolescents.129  
According to the Court, “[i]t remains true that ‘from a moral standpoint it would be 
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater 
possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.’”130  The 
Court emphasized the “limited moral culpability” of juvenile offenders.131  This 
reasoning about fundamental characteristics of juveniles cannot be logically 
restricted to apply only to the analysis of life without parole sentences; the Court 
discusses adolescents generally.  The Graham decision created a categorical rule 
prohibiting the sentence of life without parole for juveniles convicted of non-
homicide offenses such that individual consideration of mitigating information this 
particular class of offenders would be irrelevant.  However, the only way to take 
into account the “limited moral culpability” of juvenile offenders facing other 
sentences would be for courts to consider the factors that impact an individual’s 
development and, therefore, their culpability.  For example, it would be impossible 
to evaluate the culpability of a fourteen-year-old accused of committing sex 
offenses without considering information about the offender’s sexual victimization 
as a child.  Mitigating information is the key to assessing diminished culpability 
and, therefore, must be considered in order for sentencing decisions to remain 
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consistent with the fundamental reasoning of Graham.   
State appellate courts have reached different conclusions as to whether 
mitigating information about juvenile offenders must be considered in sentencing 
hearings under Graham.  As previously discussed, in People v. Mendez, a 
California appellate court interpreted Graham’s reliance on mitigating information 
and research on adolescent development to require consideration of mitigating 
evidence about a juvenile defendant facing a lengthy prison sentence at his 
sentencing.132   The court reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to 
reconsider the sentence; in accord with the opinion, the reconsideration would 
require the consideration of any mitigating information about Mendez’s 
background.133  In contrast, an appellate court in Texas recently held that trial 
courts do not have the duty “to ensure that all mitigating evidence is fully 
developed during sentencing” for juvenile offenders.134  The Texas court took the 
opposite approach of the California court, focusing on the specific holding of 
Graham rather than its reasoning.  The court explained that “discussion of a 
constitutional rule regarding mitigating evidence is conspicuously absent from the 
decision, and we do not find merit in the argument that Graham implicitly 
established” an obligation to consider mitigating evidence.135  While the California 
court focused on the reasoning in Graham, the Texas court emphasized the limited 
holding of the case.  Graham’s emphasis on the relevance of the diminished 
culpability of adolescents is consistent with requiring counsel to present mitigating 
evidence relating to a juvenile offender’s diminished culpability. 
Counsel should be required to present mitigating evidence about juvenile 
clients because their cases are unique.  Although counsel has previously only been 
required to present mitigating evidence in death penalty cases according to the 
“death is different” principle, the Graham decision stands for the proposition that 
juveniles are different too.136  Juveniles sentenced to life in prison face longer 
sentences than their adult counterparts because their sentences begin at a younger 
age.137  Thus, they face harsher penalties due to their youth.  In addition, they are 
more likely to change because they are in a process of maturation.138  Their 
characters are not yet established, and most will not continue to commit crimes as 
adults.139  Under this reasoning, it is particularly important for courts to consider 
evidence of rehabilitation or alternative sentences that would promote such 
rehabilitation.  Due to the unique situation of juvenile offenders, the Court in 
Graham applied an analytical framework previously reserved for death penalty 
cases to a non-death sentence—juvenile life without parole.140  In taking this 
approach, the Court blurred the line that distinguished the rules for death penalty 
cases from other criminal cases, particularly those involving juvenile defendants.  
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According to the same reasoning, ineffective assistance of counsel claims for 
juvenile offenders should arguably be analyzed under the standards previously 
reserved for capital cases because mitigating evidence is necessary to make 
appropriate sentencing decisions in both realms. 
The type of mitigating evidence counsel is required to present in the 
sentencing phase for capital cases is the same type of evidence courts typically 
consider in sentencing juvenile offenders, further reinforcing the similarities 
between capital sentencing and sentencing of juvenile offenders.  In the capital 
context, attorneys are responsible for gathering evidence about a defendant’s 
childhood, mental capacity, health, history of substance abuse, experiences of 
abuse or neglect, and developmental disabilities.141  The juvenile cases previously 
discussed in this Article have incorporated similar information into their analysis.  
This is the same type of information that professional standards regarding criminal 
defense of juveniles require counsel to obtain.142  It is incompetent for counsel to 
fail to present this information to a judge charged with determining a young 
person’s fate. 
B.  Establishing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
1.  Deficient Representation  
Under Strickland, an attorney is “deficient” or ineffective if his representation 
“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” as dictated “under prevailing 
professional norms.”143  The Supreme Court has considered the American Bar 
Association guidelines for defense counsel in assessing reasonable standards of 
representation in the death penalty context.144  Professional standards for the 
representation of juvenile offenders generally provide that presenting mitigating 
evidence is a critical aspect of effectively representing this population.145  The 
American Bar Association’s Center for Criminal Justice has published a set of 
Juvenile Justice Standards including recommendations for the obligations of 
counsel.  Under these standards, counsel “has a duty independently to investigate 
the client’s circumstances, including such factors as previous history, family 
relations, economic condition, and any other information relevant to 
disposition.”146  Furthermore, the Standards provide that “[t]he lawyer should seek 
to secure the assistance of psychiatric, psychological, medical or other expert 
personnel needed for purposes of evaluation, consultation, or testimony with 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390-93 (2005). 
 142. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993). 
 143. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 144. Id. at 688-89 (“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards 
and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable . . .”).  See also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387. 
 145. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993).   
 146. INST.  JUDICIAL ADMIN. & ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO 
COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES § 9.2(b) (1980).  Although these standards may be crafted with juvenile 
delinquency proceedings in mind, the same standards should apply for the representation of juveniles 
whose cases are processed through adult court because the same developmental issues apply to all 
adolescents regardless of the court. 
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respect to formation of a dispositional plan.”147  In addition, the ABA guidelines 
for representing adults require counsel to “collect information concerning the 
defendant’s background, education, employment record, mental and emotional 
stability, family relationship, ‘and the like.’”148 
Similarly, the National Juvenile Defender Center interprets the duties of 
competence and diligence to require that juvenile defense attorneys are “well-
versed in the areas of child and adolescent development” and have a “working 
knowledge,” and contact with experts, in “collateral consequences” of conviction, 
special education, abuse and neglect, cultural competence, and mental health.149  In 
addition, these standards indicate that competent juvenile defense counsel should 
consult “with mitigation specialists, social workers, and mental health, special 
education, and other experts to develop a plan consistent with the client’s expressed 
interests” at the disposition hearing.150  Counsel should also “prepare[] and 
present[] the court with a creative, comprehensive, strengths-based, individualized 
disposition alternative consistent with the client’s expressed interests.”151  Although 
these standards relate to the representation of juveniles in delinquency court, they 
are germane to representing juvenile offenders in adult court. 
Unfortunately, juvenile defense attorneys regularly and systematically fail to 
meet these standards.152  Many court-appointed attorneys are inundated with cases, 
leaving little time for in-depth preparation of each client’s case.153  There are 
unique challenges to representing youth, including communication difficulties and 
challenges to earning clients’ trust.  In the Graham decision, the Supreme Court 
discussed “special difficulties encountered by counsel in juvenile 
representation.”154  Specifically, the Court noted that juveniles “are less likely than 
adults to work effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense” due to a lack of 
trust and more “limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles 
of the institutional actors within it.”155  This is a problem among juvenile court 
attorneys that is likely more pronounced for attorneys in adult courts, who likely 
have few juvenile clients.  In addition, some attorneys do not routinely appoint 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Id. § 9.2(c). 
 148. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 cmt. (3d ed. 1993).   
 149. ROBIN WALKER STERLING, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDERS CTR., ROLE OF JUVENILE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL IN DELINQUENCY COURT 14 (2009), available at www.njdc.info/pdf/ 
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 150. Id. at 18. 
 151. Id.  
 152. See Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in 
Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 792 (2010). 
 153. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC 
DEFENSE 10 (2011), available at www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/ 
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attorneys to meet caseload standards.”).   
 154. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010). 
 155. Id. 
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experts to assist with developing the defense.156  Studies have found that juvenile 
delinquency “[a]ttorneys rarely obtained educational records, mental health 
records, or other information from the community about their clients for the 
disposition hearing.”157  Requiring attorneys to develop and present mitigating 
evidence in cases where juveniles are tried in adult court may force the criminal 
justice system to resolve some of the endemic problems plaguing the representation 
of youth.  At the very least, this standard would ensure that all youth have the 
opportunity to present mitigating evidence in the trial court or, if not, through post-
conviction remedies. 
2.  Prejudice:  Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence Impacted the Outcome 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, there must be a 
reasonable probability that the failures of counsel contributed to the sentence that 
was imposed.158  In its Three Strikes litigation, the Stanford Clinic argues that 
mitigating evidence may place a defendant outside the spirit of the Three Strikes 
law such that it should not apply.159  Similarly, in the juvenile context, counsel 
could argue that mitigating information about a juvenile defendant is essential to 
assessing the diminished culpability of an offender and is therefore required under 
the spirit of Graham, which emphasizes the importance of considering the 
diminished culpability of youth offenders in determining an appropriate 
punishment. 
Supreme Court precedent in the capital arena demonstrates that the 
presentation of mitigating information is likely to impact sentencing decisions.  In 
the same way that this information is likely to impact the decision of whether to 
impose the death penalty, it is logical to assume that mitigating evidence likely 
would impact other sentencing decisions.   Judges often have wide discretion in 
selecting the term of years to impose.  Mitigating information could impact the 
length of the sentence a judge chooses.  In addition, juvenile defendants in criminal 
court may argue that this evidence demonstrates that they should have been 
remanded to juvenile court.  Many states provide some provision for remand to 
juvenile court, or for more lenient sentencing under “youthful offender” provisions 
in adult courts.  Remand to juvenile court or sentencing as a “youthful offender” 
has major implications for the length of sentence that can be imposed.  For 
example, a young person can be incarcerated up to the age of twenty-five in 
California’s juvenile court system whereas that same youth could be imprisoned for 
                                                                                                                 
 156. See, e.g., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & NEW ENG. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MAINE:  AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY 
PROCEEDINGS 35-36 (2003), available at www.njdc.info/pdf/mereport.pdf (“One indication of the lack 
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 157. Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court–A Promise 
Unfulfilled, 44 No.3 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (2008). 
 158. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 159. Romano, supra note 79, at 336-37. 
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life through adult court.  Further, mitigating evidence is likely to be useful during 
the plea bargaining process and may result in the prosecution offering to reduce the 
charge to a less serious offense, and to a reduced prison sentence.  Mitigating 
information is recognized to have a major impact on death penalty decisions, as 
well as on dispositions in juvenile court.  It would likely have a similar impact on 
the outcomes of juvenile cases in adult courts. 
3.  Vehicles for Raising Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 
Requiring the presentation of mitigating evidence as a component of effective 
representation would facilitate post-conviction review of the cases where juveniles 
are sentenced as adults by creating a clear rule establishing that counsel who fail to 
present evidence of mitigation are deemed ineffective.  These claims would 
typically arise through a direct appeal, or by a writ of habeas corpus.  Procedurally, 
appellate counsel could raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel based 
upon trial counsel’s failure to adequately research and present mitigating evidence 
on direct appeal.  If the timeline for appeal has already expired, the claim could be 
raised through a writ of habeas corpus.160  The procedures would be similar to those 
employed in death penalty appeals where the right to present mitigating evidence, 
and counsel’s obligation to effectively gather such evidence, are clearly recognized.  
This would ensure greater equity in the representation juvenile offenders receive 
because it would provide recourse in those cases where a juvenile’s attorney does 
not adequately present crucial mitigating information.  This is particularly 
important because juveniles may be less capable of advocating for themselves due 
to their relative immaturity, making them more likely to be prejudiced by attorneys 
who do not adequately represent their interests.161 
IV.  CREATING POST-CONVICTION OPPORTUNITIES TO REVIEW SENTENCES IN LIGHT 
OF REHABILITATION 
Raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal or through 
habeas corpus writs is not the only way to incorporate the spirit of Graham into 
post-conviction review.  It may also be possible to file motions for reconsideration 
of a sentence after sufficient time has passed to demonstrate rehabilitation.  
Graham requires that juveniles sentenced for non-homicide offenses have a 
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation.”162  While making it clear that the opportunity for release is required, 
the Supreme Court did not provide additional details regarding what type of 
opportunity the Constitution requires.  The Graham decision made clear that courts 
may not determine “at the outset that [juveniles convicted of non-homicide 
offenses] never will be fit to reenter society.”163  However, the Supreme Court left 
it up to states “to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance” with its 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Writs of habeas corpus can raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  See, e.g., In re Avena, 
909 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1996). 
 161. Graham recognizes juveniles’ capacity of change and rehabilitation.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. 
Ct. 2011, 2028-30 (2010). 
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opinion.164  Creative attorneys could engage in post-conviction advocacy to have 
sentences reviewed in light of evidence of rehabilitation.  This may lead to 
legislative changes that create standardized procedures for sentence 
reconsideration.   
California’s Senate Bill 9, which has not been passed as of the publication of 
this Article, proposes a new procedure whereby all juveniles sentenced to life 
without the possibility of parole would have the opportunity to petition the court to 
reduce their sentences after they have served fifteen years in prison.165  Essentially, 
it proposes a new post-conviction process whereby juvenile offenders would have 
an opportunity to petition the sentencing court “for recall and resentencing.”166  
According to the proposed legislation, the petition must include a statement 
regarding the offender’s “remorse and work towards rehabilitation.”167  The 
sentencing court would review the petition to determine whether to hold a hearing 
to reconsider the original sentence.168  If a hearing is granted, the court would 
consider factors relating to the diminished culpability of the offender due to the 
circumstances surrounding the offense, a lack of criminal history, evidence or 
rehabilitation while in custody, and mitigating information, such as developmental 
disabilities, psychological or physical trauma, and participation in the crime with 
an adult co-defendant (who may have negatively influenced the younger co-
defendant to participate in the crime).169  
If passed, this law would only apply to those who have been sentenced to life 
without the possibility of parole.170  The bill does not address those youth who have 
been sentenced to lengthy prison sentences but who—technically—still have a 
chance to be released on parole.  Given Graham’s emphasis on the hope for 
redemption of juvenile offenders, such a procedure would make sense for all 
juveniles sentenced to lengthy prison sentences.  Even if new procedures are not 
designed to address this issue, attorneys may be able to rely upon existing law to 
bring requests for sentencing review to court.  The procedure will vary from state 
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 168. Id.  As currently written, the legislation states that a hearing to reconsider the sentence would be 
granted if the sentencing court determines one of the following facts is established by a preponderance 
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Id. 
 169. Id.  The sentencing court may consider, for example, whether the minor was convicted of 
murder on a felony murder theory, or as an accomplice.  Id. 
 170. Id. 
2012] APPEALING TO EMPATHY 415 
to state, but counsel could rely upon state provisions that allow for commutations 
of sentences by state governors and may offer evidence of rehabilitation in such 
applications.171  However, this avenue is extremely limited given that 
commutations of sentence are rarely granted. 
V.  PRESENTING MITIGATING EVIDENCE: THE ART OF GATHERING INFORMATION 
There is a growing body of work rooted in the theory of therapeutic 
jurisprudence that discusses the importance of criminal defense attorneys 
thoroughly developing mitigating information and a “rehabilitation-oriented 
packet” to use in plea negotiations or a sentencing hearing.172  Mitigation has long 
been recognized as a fundamental concept in criminal law and as a critical aspect of 
effective representation of juvenile offenders.  However, many attorneys do not 
adequately present such evidence.  There are various explanations for this failure 
on the part of some attorneys.  First, the vast majority of court-appointed attorneys 
and public defenders have too many cases to devote substantial time to gathering 
mitigating evidence.173  Some defense attorneys would consider this role to be 
outside of their obligations in non-death penalty cases.  Others do not believe that 
presenting mitigating evidence about childhood trauma or abuse would be helpful 
to their clients’ cases, or they do not have the time or knowledge to locate this 
information.174  However, there is a growing recognition that “in order to fully 
represent a client throughout all phases of the criminal justice system, they must 
take on various roles, including counsel, advisor, social worker, educator, and 
contract negotiator.”175 With regards to the time constraints making it virtually 
impossible for many attorneys to uncover this information, a standard rendering 
counsel ineffective for failing to adequately present this evidence may provide 
leverage for indigent defense systems to advocate for additional funding so that 
attorneys have sufficient resources to zealously represent their clients.  At the same 
time, it is important for attorneys to consider developing skills rooted in other 
disciplines so that they are more equipped to gather mitigating information about 
young clients 
Criminal defense attorneys typically focus on selecting appropriate experts in 
preparing mitigation evidence, and this is a critical piece of advocacy.  However, 
attorneys must do some initial groundwork in order to determine the type of experts 
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that should be appointed on a particular case.  Further, the attorney is responsible 
for providing relevant documents and information for the experts to consider.  
Failure to gather comprehensive information about a client’s background severely 
limits an attorney’s effectiveness.176  The most important starting point for 
gathering mitigating information is generally the accused and his or her family 
members.  Although at first glance it may seem that it would be simple to obtain 
information from one’s own client, research indicates that this process is more 
complicated than it seems in that “[t]here is often a conspiracy of silence between 
the youths and their family.”177  For example, study of fourteen juveniles who had 
been sentenced to the death penalty (before the Roper decision outlawed capital 
punishment for juvenile offenders) revealed that although each of the youth had 
experienced severe abuse during their childhoods, their attorneys had not presented 
this information either because they had not uncovered it or because the family 
urged them not to make the information public.178  The following section discusses 
some skills and techniques that may facilitate attorneys’ capacities to obtain 
mitigating information about their clients. 
A.  Communicating Effectively with Young Clients 
In Graham, the Supreme Court recognized that “[youth] are less likely than 
adults to work effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense.”179  The Court 
specifically cited juveniles’ limited understanding of the roles of various actors in 
the justice system and a “reluctance to trust defense counsel” as “factors [that] are 
likely to impair the quality of a juvenile defendant’s representation.”180  Attorneys 
are not typically trained in skills focused on improving communication with 
adolescent clients, but such skills are critical in terms of developing an 
understanding of the client’s life.181  Though not the only source of information, the 
client has intimate knowledge about his or her life that can help make sense of his 
or her behavior.182  Developing open communication with a young client can 
dramatically improve an attorney’s representation in court.   
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The most effective approach to effectively communicating with young clients 
runs counter to the typical communication style of attorneys.  It requires investing 
substantial amounts of time and using open-ended questions, rather than narrowly 
tailored questions aimed at eliciting specific responses.  As attorneys, we are 
keenly focused on “relevant” information and tend to become impatient when 
clients talk about “irrelevant” facts.  However, it is often by listening to our client’s 
seemingly “irrelevant” stories that we become aware of highly significant 
information.  Listening and trust-building techniques are emphasized in the fields 
of social work and psychology as foundational skills.  Attorneys who develop some 
of these skills will be better prepared to obtain potentially helpful information 
about their clients’ lives and traumatic experiences. 
1.  Building Rapport:  Working Towards Trust 
The first obstacle attorneys must overcome when representing youth is that 
many juveniles may not trust their attorneys.  Young offenders encounter various 
professionals in the criminal justice system, and they often do not understand the 
specific roles of each individual.183  The concept of attorney-client privilege is not 
widely understood by adolescents.  Further, many youth offenders are socialized to 
distrust authority figures and to keep family affairs confidential.  It is therefore 
important for an attorney to spend time explaining her role, as well as the rules 
governing confidentiality.  Developmental psychologists suggest specific 
techniques such as using diagrams and examples to make the explanation of an 
attorney’s role more concrete and, therefore, more likely to be understood by 
adolescent clients.  Emphasizing confidentiality is essential particularly given the 
importance of peer groups in adolescence.  Generally, youth in this developmental 
stage are very concerned about peer acceptance.  Those who are detained facing 
serious charges are even more concerned about appearing “tough” among their 
peers because their safety often depends on this reputation.  Showing vulnerability 
to other detained youth is seen as a sign of weakness that should be avoided at all 
costs.  Thus, attorneys should reinforce the confidential nature of their 
communications with their clients.  Privacy during attorney-client interviews is of 
utmost importance given the heightened confidentiality concerns among this 
population.  Furthermore, attorneys should explain the reasons behind asking about 
personal experiences so that their young clients understand how this information 
will be used in the case.  By explaining the rationale behind presenting mitigating 
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information and emphasizing that only the information that would be helpful to the 
client’s case will be used by the attorney, clients may be more willing to share their 
stories.   
More importantly, however, the attorney must invest time in getting to know 
the client.  Once a trusting relationship is established, the information will flow.  
Although an initial meeting may occur in the holding tanks or attorney interview 
rooms in court buildings, frequent visits to meet with the client can go a long way 
towards building trust.184  Rather than immediately asking a battery of personal 
questions about a young person’s life history, it is more effective to spend time 
talking about issues that interest the young person.  This stage in a therapeutic 
relationship is referred to as “building rapport” and is widely viewed as critical to 
the effectiveness of future therapy.  Typically, counselors devote the first two 
counseling sessions to building rapport with clients.  Skipping this step in the 
process can cause the client to feel unsafe and to guard information.  This is the 
worst result for an attorney trying to illicit mitigating information.  And yet, it is 
very difficult for attorneys to find the time to devote to this stage in the process due 
to the overwhelming caseloads of most public defenders and court appointed 
attorneys.185  Most public defenders represent many more clients than 
recommended by national guidelines and have so many cases that it is virtually 
impossible to devote enough time to fully prepare each case.186  Hopefully, one of 
the benefits of finding counsel ineffective for failing to adequately present 
mitigating information would be that policy-makers would be forced to allocate 
sufficient funding to indigent defense to bring caseloads down to recommended 
levels.  This would provide attorneys with the additional time that is necessary to 
adequately prepare a defense. 
Mitigating information often encompasses painful, traumatic experiences that a 
client would rather not discuss with anyone, particularly a stranger.  Asking clients 
to discuss these issues is more akin to therapy than to traditional legal interviews 
that focus on gathering factual information.  By investing time in building rapport, 
attorneys may be able to learn more about their clients’ personal experiences.  
Consider, for example, my experiences with a female client who I visited 
frequently in the juvenile hall where she was detained.  During some visits, we 
discussed how she was doing in school, issues with friends, and books she was 
reading.  Other times, we focused more specifically on issues relating to her legal 
case.  During informal conversations, I gathered pieces of information that 
ultimately became quite important in her case.  I found out that she had been 
sexually abused in the gang she claimed membership in.  She told me that she had 
been on a drug binge for the months leading up to her crime, and that she wanted to 
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get treatment for her drug addiction.  I also learned that she was homeless at the 
time of this incident because her mother had kicked her out of the family home.  
After three months of these meetings, she told me, “You know what, Miss?  I’m 
going to tell you the reason my mom kicked me out.  It’s because I told her that my 
dad and my grandpa used to have sex with me when I was little.”  Our unstructured 
conversations provided me with mitigation evidence that could be presented in a 
more organized, chronological fashion in a motion to the court.  This information 
also informed the choice of which experts would be most appropriate to appoint on 
the case, which ultimately included a psychologist with an expertise in sexual 
abuse.   
2.  Empathic, Non-Judgmental Listening Techniques 
Listening in an open and non-judgmental way allows clients to feel 
understood, creating an environment where they are more likely to share personal 
information that is ultimately critical for attorneys to learn about.  Reflective 
listening, or paraphrasing what a client says, is an effective way to show that the 
listener hears and understands the experiences of the speaker.187  This technique 
puts the client in the role of the expert, thus minimizing obstacles to 
communication that can otherwise result from cultural or generational 
differences.188  Reflective listening requires avoiding providing advice, sharing a 
personal opinion, or passing judgment.  Rather, the listener focuses on what is 
being said and explains what she hears.  This technique may seem simple, but it 
can be challenging to employ.  Attorneys may have to fight the urge to offer legal 
advice, or to tell the client that a particular statement is irrelevant to their defense.  
However, it is worth investing time in this process.  When people feel understood 
rather than judged, they tend to open up even more.  Thus, using reflective listening 
techniques can help an attorney to learn more and, in turn, may dramatically impact 
the presentation of a case. 
Getting below the superficial information provided in an initial interview is 
crucial.  The following case study exemplifies the difference that interviewing 
techniques can make.  A sixteen-year-old young man was sentenced to serve 
sixteen years in adult prison for an assault with a firearm.  The social worker’s 
report to the judge stated that the juvenile reported that he came from a stable, 
supportive family.  He mentioned that his father left the family for a period of time 
because he was “doing his own thing.”  The social worker did not delve into this 
issue more deeply but instead reported the youth’s version of events verbatim to the 
court.  Based on a cursory interview with the young man, she concluded that he 
was not amenable to treatment in juvenile court because he had plenty of 
opportunities at home and had not taken advantage of them.  The attorney had 
spent very little time talking with his client and was unaware that there was much 
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more to the story, so the court made the sentencing decision based on this limited 
information. 
In reality, this young man’s mother became pregnant with him as the result of 
rape; she told him that she wished she had aborted him.  She left him in the care of 
an abusive relative when he was one year old; he did not have adequate food or 
basic necessities.  He became ill and almost died as a baby.  Beginning at the age of 
three, he was sexually abused by a male family member who sodomized him on a 
regular basis.  The child was brought to the United States around the age of five, 
however, his mother’s husband was resentful towards the child.  The husband was 
an alcoholic and would beat the child with a belt when he was intoxicated.  He 
would also regularly beat the mother until she bled in the presence of the child.  At 
the age of ten, the young man began to run away, feeling desperate to get away 
from the violence and rejection at home.  He was able to feel accepted in the 
context of a gang, and he became a member at the age of twelve.  His life history 
paints quite a different picture than the summary provided by the social worker, 
which illustrates the importance of cultivating trust and taking time to gather 
information from young clients. 
A teenage client will likely not immediately understand how personal, painful 
experiences from the past relate to their current court case.  Explaining this, and 
creating a relationship that is conducive to sharing this type of information, is 
therefore critical.  Uncovering mitigating information often entails discussing 
traumatic experiences.  It is typical for people who have gone through trauma to 
shut down when talking about their experiences.  It may be helpful to back away 
from a topic that a client seems unwilling or unable to discuss because it may be 
more effective to come back to the topic at another time.  An attorney’s role is not 
to be the social worker, but the skills attorneys need in order to provide effective 
legal representation to youth overlap with skills required of social workers.  
Employing these techniques can improve the quality of legal advocacy that an 
attorney is able to provide. 
B.  Partnering with Experts in Other Disciplines 
Although attorneys regularly rely upon experts in criminal defense practice, 
many attorneys do not appoint experts to generate information useful for plea 
bargaining and sentencing, even in cases where juveniles are tried in adult court.189  
Social workers support the work of attorneys in various legal contexts and are 
particularly powerful allies for attorneys developing mitigating evidence.190  They 
are trained to conduct “bio-psycho-social” assessments of people in order to 
develop a holistic understanding of how biological, psychological, and 
environmental factors have impacted an individual’s life.  This framework is useful 
in gathering mitigating information about clients because of its comprehensive 
nature.  “Mitigation specialists” are generally hired in capital cases.  Their role is to 
help the attorney gather and present the type of evidence discussed in this Article.  
Similarly, attorneys representing juveniles facing adult sentences may consider 
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partnering with a mitigation specialist who has expertise in gathering such 
information. 
The Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Office employs psychiatric social 
workers who partner with attorneys to prepare psycho-social history reports for 
clients facing transfer from juvenile to adult court.  This team of social workers 
functions as mitigation specialists for these juvenile offenders, using therapeutic 
skills to interview clients, their family members, and others to obtain detailed 
information about the client’s life experiences.  The social worker ultimately writes 
a report highlighting the mitigating information in a young client’s life.  This 
partnership is an effective model that could be incorporated into the representation 
of youth in adult courts throughout the country.  
Attorneys must also become familiar with the wide range of issues that may 
impact their young clients in order to appoint appropriate experts to present 
additional mitigating information to the court.  Biological factors such as exposure 
to drugs or alcohol while in utero or traumatic injuries may impact an individual’s 
development.  Accordingly, these are important issues for an attorney to explore.  
Fetal alcohol spectrum disorder is particularly important to look for because of its 
prevalence and implications for young offenders.  One study found that fetal 
alcohol spectrum disorder impacts 24% of young offenders in custody.191  The 
disorder impacts cognitive functioning, can result in a wide range of developmental 
and mental health disorders, and can impact decision-making.192  
Neuropsychologists may be particularly helpful experts to investigate whether a 
particular client has a fetal alcohol spectrum diagnosis.193  Mental health issues are 
similarly important to explore, and attorneys may want to appoint a psychologist 
and/or psychiatrist to conduct an evaluation.  An attorney who is familiar with her 
client’s unique experiences and characteristics will be better suited to select experts 
whose expertise relates most closely to the client’s issues.   
C.  Obtaining Records 
In the capital context, attorneys obtain school records, records from prior 
incarcerations, and documentations of a history of alcoholism or substance 
abuse.194  These types of records can provide a wealth of information about a 
client’s life experiences and often contain extensive mitigating evidence.  School 
records, for example, may contain information about learning disabilities, 
developmental disabilities, and a child’s exposure to abuse or neglect in the home.  
Such records can be important in developing a diagnosis and can also be used to 
highlight systemic failures in a child’s life.  If a child demonstrated signs of a 
learning disability that was never diagnosed, or if a disability was diagnosed but the 
school did not provide appropriate educational services, this information can be 
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helpful in distributing blame among various social institutions rather than merely 
on the shoulders of the child.  Medical records can also be quite telling.  Birth 
records generally indicate whether a child is born with drugs in his system, or 
whether the mother consumed alcohol during pregnancy.  Childhood medical 
records may contain information about physical injuries consistent with abuse or 
neglect.  Referrals to Child Protective Services may also be noted in school or 
medical records, which can in turn lead to additional evidence.  A client may not 
even be aware of relevant records in the custody of Child Protective Services, so it 
is generally a good idea to request such records.  Mental health records should also 
be obtained if they exist.  Records from any detention centers where a young 
person has been confined may also contain helpful information and can highlight 
additional professionals who should be interviewed as potential witnesses.  
Evidence of good behavior and participation in rehabilitative efforts, for example, 
can be useful to present at a sentencing hearing.  Counsel has been found to be 
ineffective for failing to adequately investigate records in a death penalty case.195  
Given the wealth of information contained in these sources, a similar requirement 
makes sense in the juvenile context. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Juveniles prosecuted in adult courts face serious consequences – including 
spending the rest of their lives in prison – despite their immaturity and often 
traumatic upbringings.  The Supreme Court has recognized the categorical 
diminished culpability of adolescents.  The culpability of some young offenders is 
particularly diminished because of the details of their lives.  It is critical for 
attorneys to uncover and present mitigating information at sentencing hearings 
because such information may have an impact on the rest of their young clients’ 
lives.  Unfortunately, the deficient representation of juvenile offenders is widely 
recognized.  Although professional standards point to the importance of attorneys 
gathering and presenting mitigating evidence regarding juvenile clients, many fail 
to do so.  Recognizing ineffective assistance of counsel claims on the grounds that 
counsel failed to adequately present such information would encourage attorneys to 
comport with the professional standards and would give those juveniles who did 
not receive adequate assistance some recourse on appeal (or through a writ of 
habeas corpus).  This approach would be consistent with adolescent development 
principles and would be in line with the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
adolescents are fundamentally different than adults and that their behavior should 
be assessed in light of their lessened moral culpability. 
While presenting evidence of mitigation is important, there are inherent 
limitations to this approach.  Some sentencing schemes do not allow for judicial 
discretion, and courts are not able to impose shorter prison sentences even when 
faced with compelling reasons.  In other cases, reduced sentences still bring about 
injustice.  A juvenile whose sentence is reduced from eighty years to fifty years 
will likely not feel that the lower sentence is substantially different.  However, 
uncovering the tragic information about young offenders’ histories and forcing 
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courts to wrestle with the complexities of these young people’s lives may 
ultimately cultivate a greater sensitivity to the needs of this population which—
over time—has the potential to transform our approach to juvenile justice.  Rather 
than demonizing these young men and women, our society may be able to 
recognize their humanity and to craft public policies with this in mind.  Developing 
empathy across deeply entrenched boundaries of race and class is an important 
foundation for working towards justice.  As Michelle Alexander notes in The New 
Jim Crow, “[i]f we had actually learned to show love, care, compassion, and 
concern across racial lines during the Civil Rights Movement—rather than go 
colorblind—mass incarceration would not exist today.”196  Viewed from this 
perspective, cultivating empathy by presenting mitigating evidence has an 
important role to play in terms of the larger movement to end our overreliance on 
incarceration. 
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